The scheme to send back the Syrian refugees from Lebanon: goals and success chances
On October 26, 2022, the first batch of Syrian refugees left Lebanese territory for Syria, as a part of the joint plan agreed upon between the Lebanese caretaker government and the Syrian regime, which was revealed in August. The plan includes the return of 15,000 refugees per month.
It seems that both Lebanon and the Syrian regime are seeking to achieve several goals from launching such a scheme; the most prominent of which are:
• Lebanon's attempt to take a proactive step, in anticipation of the decline in European humanitarian support for the Syrian file, in light of the preoccupation with the Ukrainian crisis and the waves of refugees and the economic consequences related to energy and inflation. Therefore, it seems that the Lebanese government wants to get rid of the refugee burden; because Beirut expects a decline in the financial support provided.
• Attempts by the Lebanese political parties to start a new phase to ease the severity of the economic crisis after the conclusion of the maritime border demarcation agreement between Lebanon and Israel in October 2022. Most of these parties believe that ridding Lebanon of Syrian refugees would reduce unemployment and provide resources.
• The Syrian regime’s attempt to attract more early recovery funds from international organizations and donors, taking advantage of the desire of the countries hosting refugees to get rid of such burdens; especially if we know that Lebanon has proposed, as part of the refugee repatriation plan, the idea of transferring the sums of money paid by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to Syria.
Nevertheless, the arrival of the first batch of Syrian refugees to Syria does not guarantee the full implementation of the announced plan. There are obstacles that may prevent its full implementation:
• The UNHCR’s insistence on rejecting the process of returning refugees, due to lack of a safe security environment. Therefore, UNHCR refuses to fund early recovery operations for the Syrian areas to which refugees return. This would prompt the regime to back down from accepting the return of refugees from Lebanon.
• The possibility of EU exerting pressure on Lebanon to discourage it from implementing its plans; because of fears of an escalation of refugee migration to Europe if Lebanon insists on implementing the scheme to return them to Syria in a way that is not coordinated with the international community and without providing a safe and economically appropriate environment for them.
Both Lebanon and the regime are aware of the obstacles that may prevent the implementation of their scheme. However, this does not prevent them from trying to invest in this file. If the overall goals are not achieved, Lebanon may be satisfied with negotiating with donor countries to increase financial support as an alternative to the continuation of deporting refugees.
As for the regime, it may take advantage of this plan to attract some individuals from whom it can benefit in restructuring the military institution and injecting it with new young members. In addition to that, the regime plans to benefit at a minimum from some early recovery projects. Moreover, it should not be forgotten the fact that the regime originally has no desire to receive these refugees. It would rather obstacle the implementation of the plan.